Abstract-Many fault-tolerant algorithms are based on decisions made by a quorum of nodes. Since the algorithms are utilised in safety critical applications such as distributed databases, it is necessary to make sure that they operate reliably under every possible scenario. We introduce a generic compositional formalism, based on parameterised labelled transition systems, which allows us to express safety properties of parameterised quorum systems. We prove that any parameterised verification task expressible in the formalism collapses into finitely many finite state refinement checking problems. The technique is implemented in a tool, which performs the verification completely automatically. As an example, we prove the leader election phase of the Raft consensus algorithm correct for an arbitrary number of terms and for a cluster of any size.
Introduction
Many fault-tolerant distributed algorithms are based on decisions made by a quorum of nodes. Consensus and atomic broadcast protocols, Paxos [1] , Zab [2] , and Raft [3] , are examples of such algorithms. They are used in distributed databases and key-value stores, which are from time to time under a heavy load. In these circumstances, seemingly rare combinations of events become frequent [4] , which implies that it is necessary to make sure that the algorithms operate reliably under every possible scenario. Consequently, the verification of fault-tolerant distributed systems has gained a lot of attention recently [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] .
We introduce a formal theory for modelling and analysing quorum systems. The key characteristics of such systems is that their topology evolves over time and connectivity is defined by quorum sets, subsets which cover more than a half of the base set, which can be, e.g., the set of all servers. As a running example, we consider the leader election phase of the Raft consensus algorithm [3] . In Raft, time is divided into terms of arbitrary length, numbered with consecutive integers, and a server can crash at any moment. When a server is running, it is in one of three states, a follower, candidate, or leader. A server always (re)starts as a follower. A follower can vote for at most one server in a term. If a follower does not regularly receive messages from the leader, it increases its term and promotes itself to a candidate. A candidate sends vote requests to the other servers and if it receives a quorum of votes, it becomes a leader. However, if a server learns that another server has a higher term, it updates its term and reverts back to the follower. Our goal is to formally prove that in each term, there is at most one leader independent of the number of terms and the size of the cluster.
Technically, our approach is based on parameterised labelled transition systems (PLTSs) [12] , where a system implementation and specification are basically expressed as the parallel composition of labelled transition systems (LTSs). On the implementation side, one can use hiding, too, and correctness is understood as trace refinement, which allows for the analysis of safety properties. The current theory allows for compositional reasoning and lends support to multiple parameters controlling the number of replicated LTSs. It also allows for the specification of the system topology by using the universal fragment of first order logic. This includes systems with, e.g., a star, bipartite, and totally (un)connected topology. However, systems with a quorum topology are not supported since in order to specify a quorum set, we should be able to say that for each element not in the set, there is a unique element in the set. This requires the use of existential quantification, which makes the verification problem undecidable [12] . Another possibility to model quorum sets is to use a counter over replicated components, but also this quickly leads to undecidability.
In this paper, we equip the PLTS formalism with parameters of a new kind, quorum function variables (QFVs), while maintaining compositionality. QFVs can be thougth as functions from tuples of the ids of replicated components to quorum sets of the ids of replicated components. By using a QFV which assigns a quorum set for each server in each term, we can model, e.g., the leader election phase of Raft where the connectivity of the servers may change from term to term. After that, we prove that for each verification task expressible in our formalism, there are upper bounds, cutoffs, to the parameters such that if the system meets the specification for all parameter values up to the cut-offs, then the system is correct with respect to the specification for all parameter values. The cut-offs are computable and often very tight, because they are not shared by all verification tasks expressible in the formalism as in [13] , but determined for each implementation and specification process separately. After obtaining the cut-offs, the verification can be completed by using efficient, existing tools for finite state systems. The whole process is implemented by extending Bounds tool, earlier introduced in [14] . In order to handle the QFVs, the results of [12] are not only adapted to take QFVs into account but several completely new results (Proposition 21, Lemma 23, Proposition 24, and Proposition 26) on the cut-offs of quorum sets are introduced.
The unique features of our formalism are its ability to express parameterised quorum systems, the support for compositional reasoning, and decidability. We are not aware of other formalisms with all these features.
In terms of compositional parameterised verification, the closest related works are the data independence (DI) results [15] , the behavioural fixed point (BFP) technique [16] (similar to the network invariant method [17] ), and the combination of these, the data independent induction [18] . DI applies to systems with parameterised data types but a fixed number of processes and the BFP technique can handle systems with a linear topology, whereas our focus is on systems with an arbitrary number of processes with a quorum topology. Actually, both the techniques are already combined with our original verification technique without the QFVs in [19] , [20] , but the same extensions should work with our QFV-enabled formalism, too. That is because the BFP technique is applied before and the DI results after our approach. Our verification technique is previously adapted to modal interface automata [21] , too, but neither this formalism lends support to the analysis of systems with a quorum topology.
From the viewpoint of quorum systems, the closest related work is probably the parametric interval abstraction (PIA) [8] . PIA applies to parameterised systems with threshold transitions, which can be used to model quorum systems. However, the technique does not lend support to compositional reasoning and since it is abstraction-based, termination is not guaranteed. In [9] , quorum transitions are introduced in order to treat a parameterised Paxos protocol, but this approach only enables verification with respect to some parameters. Theorem proving techniques, which typically involve some degree of user intervention, for the formal verification of the Raft protocol are considered in [10] , [11] , and the efficient verification of the small instances of parameterised quorum systems in [5] , [6] , [7] .
There are also several other approaches to parameterised verification based on cut-offs [13] , [22] , induction [16] , [17] , [18] , abstraction [23] , [24] , [25] , and infinite state verification algorithms [26] , [27] . However, most cut-off results and infinite state verification algorithms do not lend support to quorum topologies or topologies that evolve over time because it often breaks decidability. On the other hand, induction and abstraction methods are typically incomplete and not guaranteed to terminate.
In the next section, we recall the calculus of LTSs. After that, we equip LTSs with parameters and show that the resulting parameterised formalism is compositional. In Section 4, we present our main result, the cut-off theorem for PLTSs with QFVs. The paper concludes with discussion on future work.
Labelled Transition Systems
In this section, we briefly recall a CSP-like LTS-based process calculus with parallel composition and hiding operators and trace refinement [28] . Basically, the only difference with the usual LTS notation is that events have an explicit data part which makes adding parameterisation convenient.
We assume that there is a countably infinite set of events. One of them is the invisible event, denoted , and the other events are visible. The visible events have an explicit channel and data part; we assume countably infinite sets ℂ and of respectively channels and constants and that each visible event is of the form (e), where is a channel and e is a finite tuple of constants.
A labelled transition system (LTS) is a four-tuple := ( , , ,˙), where (1) is a non-empty set of states, (2) is a set of visible events, (3) ⊆ × ( ∪ { }) × is a set of transitions, and (4)˙is the initial state. The second component is called the alphabet (of ).
Let be an LTS ( , , ,˙) for both ∈ {1, 2}. The parallel composition (of 1 and 2 ) is an LTS
where ∥ is the set of all triples The operators and the trace refinement relation have many useful properties [12] , [28] , [29] , which are exploited in the proofs. The parallel composition is commutative, associative, and idempotent with respect to ≡ tr (i.e., ∥ ≡ tr for all LTSs ) and a single-state LTS id := ({˙}, ∅, ∅,˙) with the empty alphabet and no transition is the identity element of ∥. This allows us to extend ∥ to every finite set = { 1 , . . . , } and all LTSs 1 , . . . , by defining
Moreover, distributing hiding over parallel composition results in an LTS greater in the preorder; 
Parameterised Labelled Transition Systems
In this section, we equip LTSs with parameters while preserving compositionality. This will be done in the same fashion as in [12] , but here we also introduce parameters of a new kind, quorum function variables. We write ℙ ( ) for the set of all the quorum sets of , i.e., the set of all subsets of which cover more than half of , and ℙ qe ( ) for the set ℙ ( ) ∪ {∅}, which includes the empty set, too.
In order to model Raft, we parameterise LTSs and operators with types, variables, and quorum function variables (QFVs) . A type represents a finite non-empty set of constants that are typically used as the identifiers of replicated components of a certain kind. A variable represents a single constant, i.e., it typically refers to an individual component of a certain type. A QFV represents a function which maps a tuple of constants to a quorum set of a certain type or to the empty set. Hence, a QFV typically maps a tuple of component ids to a quorum set of component ids or to the empty set. The sets of types, variables, and QFVs are denoted by , , and , respectively.
Formally, we assume that (1) for each type there is a countably infinite set ⊆ denoting the elements of the type such that and are disjoint for different types and , (2) for each variable there is a type determining the domain of , and (3) 
Definition 2 (Valuation).
A valuation is a function whose domain is a finite set of types, variables, and QFVs such that 1) for each type ∈ dom( ), ( ) is a finite nonempty subset of , 2) for every variable ∈ dom( ), ∈ dom( ) and ( ) ∈ ( ), and 3) for every QFV Π ∈ dom( ), Π ,
A valuation is extended to sets and tuples of types, variables, and QFVs in the usual way, by applying it to each tuple componentwise and to each set elementwise. Note that the value of a QFV may be a function that maps some of its arguments to the empty set instead of a quorum set. This is needed to carry out the proof of Proposition 18.
Example 3. For our Raft model, we pick a type to represent the set of the identifiers of servers and a type to represent the set of the identifiers of terms. We also use a QFV Π with Π = and T Π = ( , ) to assign each server and each term a set of servers from which the server needs a vote in order to become a leader in the term. Variables 0 , 1 , and 2 of the type are used to refer to individual servers and a variable of the type is used to refer to a specific term.
If we want to consider an instance of Raft with three servers and a single term, we can use, for instance, a valuation such that
is a quorum set of ( ). In the context of our model, it means that in order for the server 1 to become a leader in the term 1 , it needs a vote from itself and the server 2 . On the other hand, ( 3 , 1 ) is mapped to the empty set, which means that the server 3 should not be able to become a leader in the term 1 .
We use guards to represent (i) (in)equality tests between variables and (ii) inclusion tests between a variable and a quorum set. Formally, a guard is a propositional formula which is formed from atomic expressions of the form Let be a guard and a compatible valuation. Theinstance of or the instance of (generated by ), denoted by
, is the value of the proposition which is obtained from by substituting true for ⊤, ( ) for every variable , and (Π) for every QFV Π occurring in .
Example 4. Let us consider a guard :
, where Π is a QFV and 0 , 1 , and are the variables of Example 3. The guard represents a claim: "the server 0 , which is different from 1 , needs a vote from 1 in order to become a leader in the term ." The guard has four parameters, namely the variables 0 , 1 , and the QFV Π , which implies that par( ) = { 0 , 1 , , Π , , }. Let be the valuation of Example 3. Obviously, is compatible with and since ( 0 ) ∕ = ( 1 ) and
A structure (x), where is a channel and x a tuple of variables, is a parameterised visible event. The sim-plest PLTSs are basically LTSs where parameterised visible events are substituted for the ordinary ones.
Definition 5 (EPLTS). An elementary parameterised LTS (EPLTS)
is a four-tuple ( , Σ, Δ,˙), where (1) is a finite non-empty set of states, (2) Σ is a finite set of parameterised visible events, (3) Δ ⊆ × (Σ ∪ { }) × is a finite set of parameterised transitions, and (4)˙is the initial state.
Example 6. In order to model the Raft specification, we first consider it from the viewpoint of two servers, 0 and 1 , and a term . We use a parameterised event leader ( , ), where ∈ {0, 1}, to denote that the server is chosen as a leader in the term . Here, leader is a channel and 0 , 1 , and are variables of the type , , and , respectively. Now, the specification from the viewpoint of two servers and a term can be formalised as an EPLTS Spec2 ( 0 , 1 , ) in Figure 1 , which formally says that no two servers can become a leader during the same term but repeating a leader announcement is fine.
representing the Raft specification from the viewpoint of two servers, 0 and 1 , and a term More complicated PLTSs are constructed from elementary ones by using guards and (replicated) parallel composition and hiding operators. A variable is bound in a PLTS if it occurs in and its every occurrence is within a substructure ∥ ′ of . The other variables occurring in are free in . The parameters of are the free variables, the types of bound variables, and the QFVs occurring in . Now, the sets par( ) and par( ) and the notion of compatibility can be defined like in the case of guards: par( ) is the set of all parameters of and par( ) is the set of all parameters of plus the types of the parameters. We may also write (x, T, Π) to emphasise that is a PLTS the parameters of which are the variables in the tuple x, the types in the tuple T, and the QFVs in the tuple Π. A valuation is compatible with if and only if par( ) ⊆ dom( 
Definition 7 (PLTS
We can also write ( (x), (T), (Π)) for the -instance of a PLTS (x, T, Π).
Example 9.
Recall the EPLTS Spec2 of Figure 1 representing the partial Raft specification. As we let the variable to range over all term identifiers and 0 and 1 over all servers identifiers, we obtain the model of the full specification
which says that for each term, there can be at most one leader. Moreover, the guard guarantees that the leader is a server that voted for itself in this term. Note that since Spec2 has no bound variable, par(Spec2 ) = { 0 , 1 , } but par(Spec2 ) = { 0 , 1 , , , }. On the other hand, Spec has no free variable. That is why par(Spec) = par(Spec) = {Π , , }. In order to visualize Spec, let us consider a valuation such that ( ) = { 1 }, ( ) = { 1 , . . . , } and ∈ (Π )( , 1 ) for all ∈ {1, . . . , }. Obviously, the valuation is compatible with Spec and the -instance of Spec is a star-shaped LTS in Figure 2 , which indeed says that there can be at most one leader for the term 1 .
. . . We complete our parameterised formalism by extending the trace refinement relation to the set of PLTSs while preserving compositionality. Parameterised verification tasks can be now expressed with the aid of PLTSs and the relation above. Given a system implementation PLTS and a system specification PLTS , we consider to be correct (with respect
Definition 10 (Trace refinement on PLTSs
The behaviour of the implementation of Raft is modelled in the same fashion as the specification. First, we capture it in the follower/candidate mode from the viewpoint of servers 0 , 1 , 2 and a term in an EPLTS Flw3 in Figure 3 . The EPLTS says that in the term , the server 0 can vote for either 1 or 2 , but not both, or become a candidate. When we let the variables 1 , 2 , and to range over all values in their domain (with the restriction that the values of 1 and 2 are different), we obtain the model of a single server 0 running in the follower mode as the PLTS
which formally states that a server can vote for at most one server in the term or become a candidate. Figure 3 . EPLTS Flw3 ( 0 , 1 , 2 , ) representing the Raft implementation in the follower/candidate mode from the viewpoint of servers 0 , 1 , 2 and a term Second, we model the Raft implementation in the candidate/leader mode from the viewpoint of servers 0 , 1 and a term as an EPLTS Ldr2 in Figure 4 . This model says that once the server 0 becomes a candidate and receives a vote from the server 1 , it can promote itself to a leader in the term . As we let to range over all term ids and 1 to range over all values in a quorum set of the server 0 for the term , the model of a single server 0 running in the leader mode is obtained as the PLTS
which says that in order for a server to become a leader, it needs to become a candidate and then receive a vote from a quorum of servers, including itself. When we compose the partial models in parallel and let 0 to range over all server ids, we obtain the model of the Raft implementation with an arbitrary many servers and terms as the PLTS
In order to analyse the correctness of Raft, we hide the events which are irrelevant to the specification. We write LE for the set {vote, candidate} and Raft ′ for the PLTS Raft ∖ LE . Now, the problem whether the protocol operates correctly can be formalised as the question whether Raft ′ ⪯ tr Spec holds.
Note that in our model, a quorum set needed by a server to become a leader can change from term to term. Hence, the formalism enables the specification of parameterised systems where the topology evolves over time but for each instance, the changes in the topology are fixed a priori. This is not a restriction though since every possible combination of topology changes is covered by some valuation. Hence, every trace of the protocol is contained in some instance of the model, which is sufficient for the analysis of safety properties.
Refinement Checking PLTSs
In this section, we show how to compute structural cutoffs for types such that to prove a parameterised system correct for all the parameter values it is sufficient to check only finitely many instances up to the cut-offs, provided the specification does not involve hiding. The requirement on not using hiding in specifications is necessary for decidability [12] . However, the restriction is not severe since hiding is typically only applied on the implementation side. Hence, from now on, an implementation PLTS refers to any PLTS, whereas a specification PLTS means a PLTS which does not involve hiding.
Intuitively, the main steps of our reduction technique are the following: 1) First, we show that if a big instance of the implementation PLTS (resp., a specification PLTS ) is composed of the same components as a set of small instances and each small instance of is a trace refinement of the corresponding instance of , then the big instance of is a trace refinement of the big instance of , too (Proposition 18). 2) Second, we prove that there is an upper limit for the size of small instances which is obtained by a structural analysis of the system implementation and specification (Propositions 21 and 26). 3) By combining the above results, we see that a trace refinement checking task on PLTSs reduces to finitely many refinement checking tasks on finite state LTSs (Theorem 28).
Next, we present the technique formally.
Definition 13 (Set of the processes of an instance). Let be a PLTS and a compatible valuation. The set of the processes (of the -instance of )
, denoted by prc( , ), is defined inductively as follows: Flw3 ( , , , ) )))))} . 
Example 14. Let be a valuation with the domain
{ , , Π } such that ( ) = { 1 , . . . , }, ( ) = { 1 , .
. . , }, and for all ∈ {1, . . . , } and all
∈ {1, . . . , }, (Π )( , ) is a quorum set of ( ) such that ∈ (Π )( , ). Then prc(Spec, ) is ∪ =1 ∪ =1 ∪ =1 {( , ( , ( , Spec2 ( , , ) )))} and prc(Raft ′ , ) is ∪ =1 ∪ =1 ∪ =1 ∈ (Π )( , ) {( , ( 1, ( , ( , Ldr2 ( , , ) ))))} ∪ ∪ =1 ∪ =1 ∪ =1 ∕ = ∪ =1 {( , ( 2, ( , ( , ( ,
Definition 15 (Subvaluation
We say that the 1 Since a valuation and its subvaluations map the variables in the same way, it is obvious that an instance of an EPLTS equals the instance of the EPLTS generated by a smaller valuation. A similar result holds for guards as well.
Lemma 17. Let be an EPLTS, a guard, a type, and
, valuations compatible with and such that is a { }-subvaluation of . Then the following holds. . By the compositionality of the trace refinement, this implies that we can derive the correctness of a big system instance from the correctness of small instances. The proposition allows us to discard (big) instances but it does not clearly say which instances we should keep. This piece of information is hidden in the condition which requires the set of the processes of the big instance to be the same as the set of the processes of the small ones. Since each element in prc( , ) depends on the values of finitely many variables as well as the values of finitely many QFVs, the size of the valuations we should keep is determined by the number of free and bound variables and the number of QFVs in .
To put it more formally, we write free ( ) for the set { ∈ ∩ par( ) | = } of the free variables of the type occurring in , bnd ( ) for the maximum number of the nested bound variables of the type in , formally defined as
and deg ( ) for the maximum number of the structures of the form Π(x) in a branch of the syntax tree of such that Π = , formally defined as
, where -deg ( ) is the number of structures Π(x) in such that Π = (multiple occurrences of the same structure Π(x) are not counted),
Example 20. Recall the Raft specification Spec. It involves three substructures of the form ∥ ′ , one with = and two with = , which means that bnd (Spec) = 1 and bnd (Spec) = 2. Similarly, there are two structures of the form Π(x), both with Π = , which gives deg (Spec) = 0 and deg (Spec) = 2. Since Spec has no free variable, free (Spec) = free (Spec) = ∅.
As regards the Raft implementation Raft ′ , it has six substructures of the form ∥ ′ . For = , three of them are nested and for = , only one of them is nested, which gives bnd (Raft ′ ) = 1 and bnd (Raft ′ ) = 3. Moreover, as only one structure of the form Π(x) occurs in Raft ′ and in this case Π = , we get deg (Raft ′ ) = 0 and deg (Raft ′ ) = 1. Since Raft ′ has no free variable, 
We argue by induction on the structure of by using the lemma as an induction hypothesis.
In the base step, is an EPLTS. First, note that Φ is non-empty. Secondly, since each ∈ Φ is a subvaluation of , by Lemma 17,  
. . , be the non-empty sets (Π)( (x)) such that Π(x) occurs in and Π = . Now, 1 , . . . , are quorum sets of ( ) and
∩ ( ) are quorum sets of ( ). This means that (Π)( (x)) = ∅ if and only if (Π)( (x)) = ∅ whenever Π(x) with Π = occurs in . Since [[ ]] is true, by Lemma 17, it implies that [[ ]] is true as well. Hence, ∈ Φ which, in turn, means that the induction hypothesis is applicable to ′ , , and Φ . Therefore, prc(
2. Next, we consider the case when is 1 ∥ 2 . Let ∈ {1, 2} and ⊆ ( ) such that (free ( )) ⊆ and | | ≤ |free ( )| + bnd ( ), and let 1 , . . . , be quorum sets of ( ) such that ≤ deg ( ). Since free ( ) ⊆ free ( ), bnd ( ) ≤ bnd ( ), and deg ( ) ≤ deg ( ), we know that | ∪ (free ( ))| ≤ |free ( )| + bnd ( ) and ≤ deg ( ). By assumption, it means that there is ∈ Φ such that ∪ (free ( )) ⊆ ( ) and 1 ∩ ( ), . . . , ∩ ( ) are quorum sets of ( ). Therefore, the induction hypothesis is applicable to 1 and 2 . Hence, prc( , ) = ∪ ∈Φ prc( , ) for both ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that
Let us then assume that is
are quorum sets of ( ), and ≤ deg ( ).
By assumption, it means that there is ∈ Φ such that ⊆ ( ) and 1 ∩ ( ), . . . , ∩ ( ) are quorum sets of ( ).
Hence, the induction hypothesis is applicable to ′ , ′ , and Φ ′ , which means that prc(
4.
Finally, the case when is ′ ∖ is trivial, because free ( ) = free ( ′ ), bnd ( ) = bnd ( ′ ), and deg ( ) = deg ( ′ ). Hence, by the induction principle, the lemma is correct.
In order to put the assumption of Proposition 21 into a more explicit form, we need a function : ℕ × ℕ → ℕ, which can be described as follows. Let us suppose that we have quorum sets of , a subset of , and we want to reduce the size of by removing from ∖ as many elements as possible such that the sets remain quorum sets. Then ( , | |) gives an upper bound for the size of the reduced . Consequently, is called a quorum bound function.
Definition 22 (Quorum bound function). A function
: The existence of a quorum bound function is a combinatorial problem, which resembles Ramsey theoretic questions [30] and the Zarankiewicz problem, an unsolved problem in extremal graph theory [31] . Fortunately, we can restrict our attention to minimal quorum sets and formulate the problem in terms of linear algebra. After that, a quorum bound function can be defined with the aid of the maximum of the component-wise sum of the minimal elements of a semi-linear set. 
For each , the value of can be determined by using an SMT solver for linear arithmetic. By using the SMT solver Z3 [32] , we have learned that 0 = 0, 1 = 2 = 2, 3 = 4, 4 = 6, and 5 = 10. Computing 0 , . . . , 4 took less than a second whereas the computation of 5 took an hour on Intel i7-4770 with 8GB of memory. For greater values of , Z3 run out of memory. Fortunately, these values are sufficient for many practical verification tasks, including our Raft example, where for each type , the sum of deg ( ) over nested guards is small. Nevertheless, in future, we hope to be able to prove an explicit formula for .
With the aid of a quorum bound function, we can define explicit structural cut-offs for each verification task expressible in the formalism.
Definition 25 (Cut-off). The cut-off (size) for a type , an implementation PLTS , and a specification PLTS is Proof. The claim follows relatively straightforwardly from the definition of a cut-off and a quorum bound function.
Without affecting the result of verification, it is sufficient to consider valuations which are non-isomorphic, i.e., cannot be obtained from each other by bijective renaming of constants. We write 1 ∕ ≃ 2 to denote that the valuations 1 and 2 are non-isomorphic. Definition 27 (Cut-off set). Let be an implementation PLTS and a specification PLTS. A set Φ of valuations is a cut-off set (for and ) if Φ is a maximal set of valuations with the domain par( ∥ ) such that | ( )| ≤ co ( , ) for every type ∈ dom( ) and 1 ∕ ≃ 2 whenever 1 and 2 are different elements of Φ.
By combining the results above, we get the main result of the paper, which allows for reducing a trace refinement task among PLTSs to finitely many refinement checks between finite state LTSs. Theorem 28 gives rise to a completely automatic parameterised verification approach which we have implemented by extending our Bounds tool [14] . The tool inputs an implementation and specification PLTS and computes cutoffs for the types by using Theorem 28. Since the cut-offs provided by the theorem are only rough structural ones, the tool tries to improve them further by checking the assumptions of Proposition 18 up to the rough bounds and by discarding the big instances which satisfy the assumptions of the proposition. After that, Bounds produces the trace refinement checking tasks up to the improved cutoffs. Finally, the outputted finite state verification questions are solved by using the refinement checker FDR3 [33] , which gives the answer to the parameterised verification task. Bounds is publicly available at [34] .
Example 30. When applied to our example, Bounds first generates all non-isomorphic valuations up to the cut-offs of seven servers and one term. There are altogether 395,790 of them, since the value of the QFV Π can be chosen in numerous ways. Enumerating all valuations takes 47 seconds. After that, the tool applies Proposition 18, which reveals that only 18 instances have to be actually verified. These are the instances up to three servers, and this phase takes 262 seconds. Finally, by using FDR3, all remaining instances are found to be correct within two seconds. This implies that for an arbitrary number of terms and a cluster of any size, Raft operates correctly in the sense that there is at most one leader in each term. The experiment was done on an 8-thread Intel i7-4770 with 8GB of memory and details are found in the appendix [35] .
Once we have proved that a system implementation refines its specification, we can use the specification, which is usually much smaller, in place of the system implementation in further verification efforts. This is possible since our QFVenabled PLTS formalism is compositional.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a formalism for expressing parameterised quorum systems and their specifications. The formalism is compositional and it is supported by a fully automated technique that reduces a parameterised verification task into finitely many finite state verification problems. The reduction is sound and complete and determined by the structure of parameterised processes. The technique is implemented in a tool and applied to prove the correctness of the leader election part of Raft.
An obvious topic for future research is discovering an explicit formula for a quorum bound function. We also aim to consider byzantine errors as well as to verify the log replication phase of Raft, i.e., to analyse the correctness of the full Raft protocol.
